A Colossal Bird’s Nest: The Backlash Surrounding theManagement of the Gulf of Mexico Red SnapperFishery by René, Etienne
LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources 
Volume 4 
Issue 2 Spring 2016 
8-1-2016 
A Colossal Bird’s Nest: The Backlash Surrounding 
theManagement of the Gulf of Mexico Red SnapperFishery 
Etienne René 
Repository Citation 
Etienne René, A Colossal Bird’s Nest: The Backlash Surrounding theManagement of the Gulf of Mexico 
Red SnapperFishery, 4 LSU J. of Energy L. & Resources (2016) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jelr/vol4/iss2/16 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources by an authorized editor 
of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu. 
  
 
 
A Colossal Bird’s Nest: The Backlash Surrounding the 
Management of the Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper 
Fishery 
INTRODUCTION 
“Think about it like this,” posited one member of the Theodore 
Roosevelt Conservation Partnership, “[i]f the federal government told the 
states of Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada that 
their hunters were going to get one day to kill a mule deer on their own, 
but if they were willing to pay a guide, they’d get 40 days,” what option 
would the hunters choose?1 The question, propounded in response to new 
federal regulations bearing on red snapper populations in the Gulf of 
Mexico, juxtaposes the interests of sportsmen in two drastically different 
environments. By recently passing regulations regarding Gulf of Mexico 
red snapper, the federal government has reeled important and controversial 
issues to the surface of the whirling sea of discontent between Gulf 
fishermen and government agencies. Is there merit to the conservationist’s 
analogy? And, if so, how and why would behavioral patterns of Midwest 
hunters be applicable to red snapper fishermen in the Gulf Region? 
The Gulf red snapper persists as a hot commodity for the tourism and 
fishing industries in the Gulf region as well as in restaurants across the 
United States. The bright rosy-red hue of the red snapper’s scales conceals 
the soft, white, mild-flavored meat that leaves seafood lovers craving 
more. These beautiful creatures glide effortlessly through the Gulf of 
Mexico’s reefs and oil rigs everyday, yet they are completely unaware of 
the storm brewing above the surface. 
Federal management of red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico has been 
described as “a mess,”2 “pure chaos,”3 and “a painfully obvious attempt to 
disenfranchise the recreational sector in favor of the desires of a New York 
based environmental activist group to end public access to the red snapper 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2016, by ETIENNE RENÉ. 
 1. Todd Masson, Feds to give Significant Portion of Recreational Red-snapper 
Quota to Charter-boat Industry, NOLA, (Nov. 1, 2014, 12:53 PM), http://www.nola 
.com/outdoors/index.ssf/2014/10/feds_to_give_significant_porti.html [https://perma 
.cc/EJ79-2DGU]. 
 2. David Cresson, Guest Commentary: Gulf Fishery Management a Huge 
Mess, THE ADVOCATE, (Aug. 28, 2014), http://theadvocate.com/news/opinion 
/10116820-123/guest-commentary-gulf-fishery-manangement [https://perma.cc 
/Y76Y-4J5F]. 
 3. Chaos Reigns at Gulf Council, COASTAL CONSERVATION ASS’N (July 31, 
2014), http://www.joincca.org/articles/680 [https://perma.cc/HA3A-YWFD]. 
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fishery.”4 Indeed, both fishermen and federal agencies alike have fallen 
under fire for the disorderly management of the fishery. 
Demand for the high quality of red snapper has prompted both 
commercial5 and recreational6 fishermen to harvest the species as quickly 
and efficiently as possible.7 This “derby-style” competition has led to 
immense problems in the management of the species. Proliferating 
litigation, incredibly short fishing seasons, and federal emergency rulings 
have converged, casting the Gulf red snapper fishery into a frenzied and 
confusing state.8 
Disagreements and competition among commercial and recreational 
fishermen, coupled with regulations that fail to address those conflicts 
fairly and successfully, continue to swirl around this economically and 
socially important fish. One factor vital to the disputes over red snapper 
management in the Gulf concerns the actual health of the Gulf red snapper 
population. Some red snapper fishermen, furious with the exceedingly 
truncated length of recent federal red snapper seasons in the Gulf, allege 
that the red snapper population is healthier than it has ever been; they view 
the short seasons as a denial of access to an abundant natural resource.9 
Federal agencies and other interested parties, however, assert that, because 
the species is overfished, these measures are a necessary component of a 
rebuilding plan.10 Regardless of the validity of either side’s contention, the 
recent federal management standards utilized in regulating Gulf red 
                                                                                                             
 4. Vitter Urges Gulf Council to Table Divisive Red Snapper Proposal, 
COASTAL CONSERVATION ASS’N, http://www.ccalouisiana.com/cca11/index.php 
/press-room-60/press-releases/582-vitter-urges-gulf-council-to-table-divisive-red-
snapper-proposal [https://perma.cc/88EL-ZLDC] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016). 
 5. Commercial fishing is specified as “fishing in which the fish harvested, either 
in whole or in part, are intended to enter commerce or enter commerce through sale, 
barter, or trade.” 16 U.S.C. § 1802(4) (2013). 
 6. Recreational fishing is designated as “fishing for sport or pleasure.” 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1802(37) (2013). 
 7. See Gulf Anglers Unite for Red Snapper, THE RECREATIONAL FISHING 
ALLIANCE (Apr. 2, 2014), http://joinrfa.org/2014/04/31314-gulf-anglers-unite-for-
red-snapper/ [https://perma.cc/MDJ2-HW8A]. 
 8. This comment will analyze each of these issues and how they relate to current 
problems with federal Gulf red snapper management. 
 9. Help Fix the Gulf Red Snapper Problem, AMERICAN FISHING TACKLE 
COMPANY (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.aftco.com/wheelhouse/gulf-red-snapper-do-
your-part/ [https://perma.cc/9X4E-DF6Z]. 
 10. GULF OF MEXICO FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, RECREATIONAL RED SNAPPER 
SECTOR SEPARATION: FINAL AMENDMENT 40 TO THE FISHERY MGMT. PLAN FOR THE 
REEF FISH RESOURCES OF THE GULF OF MEXICO, 1 (2014), available at 
http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sustainable_fisheries/gulf_fisheries/reef_fish/2013/am40/d
ocuments/pdfs/gulf_rf_am40_feis.pdf [hereinafter FINAL AMENDMENT 40]; see also 
Red Snapper, HARTE RESEARCH INST. GULF OF MEXICO STUDIES, http://www 
.harteresearchinstitute.org/ochealth-research/red-snapper [https://perma.cc/B9S7-
ECX8] (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) [hereinafter HARTE RESEARCH INST.]. 
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snapper have sparked tremendous controversy, litigation, quota overages, 
violations of federal law, and inequitable access to red snapper for certain 
fishermen. 
Many red snapper fishermen are worried that the recent enactment of 
Amendment 40 to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish 
Resources of the Gulf of Mexico (Amendment 40) marked the beginning 
of the privatization of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper industry.11 These 
fishermen allege that the approval of the amendment will ultimately place 
access to Gulf red snapper in the hands of a few individuals for private 
profit.12 Determining the credibility of this assertion necessitates an 
examination of the current status of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery 
and the adequacy of the management measures used to regulate the 
species. 
In order to compete with state regulations and fishermen’s rapid 
harvesting of red snapper, federal regulations have continuously been 
enacted that attempt to cure short-term concerns, but those regulations fail 
to address the underlying issue creating the predicament with red snapper 
management. An analysis of recent federal regulations, litigation, and 
statistics regarding the harvesting of red snapper illuminates the main 
problem: The inadequate regulation of the recreational red snapper fishing 
sector lies at the root of the problems in overall Gulf red snapper 
management. 
This comment addresses the issues with contemporary federal 
regulations governing the Gulf of Mexico recreational red snapper fishery 
and suggests the appropriate approach to take in managing the species. 
Part I will provide a brief history of the Gulf red snapper fishery and the 
administrative and legal authority under which the fishery is governed. 
Next, Part II will explore the promulgation of the first federal rules 
concerning Gulf red snapper, along with the federal management strategy 
of the recreational sector of the fishery utilized until the enactment of 
Amendment 40. Part III will examine initial litigation, the 2014 
recreational red snapper season, and the reasons for the chaos surrounding 
the regulation of the fishery in recent years. Part IV will discuss 
Amendment 40 and its objectives, the 2015 recreational red snapper 
                                                                                                             
 11. See GULF OF MEXICO FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, RECREATIONAL RED 
SNAPPER SECTOR SEPARATION: DRAFT OPTIONS FOR AMENDMENT 40 TO THE 
FISHERY MGMT. PLAN FOR THE REEF FISH RESOURCES OF THE GULF OF MEXICO, 1 
(2014), available at http://gulfcouncil.org/docs/amendments/Amendment 
%2040%20Sector%20Separation.pdf [hereinafter DRAFT OPTIONS FOR AMENDMENT 
40]; see also Amendment 40 Privatization Scheme, COASTAL CONSERVATION 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.joincca.org/Amendment40_Highlights [https://perma.cc 
/LH27-NALV] (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Amendment 40 Privatization 
Scheme]. 
 12. See Amendment 40 Privatization Scheme, supra note 11. 
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season, recent litigation, and why Amendment 40 is not the solution for 
the long-term management of the fishery. Finally, Part V proposes the 
optimal solution to resolve the issues facing federal Gulf red snapper 
management. 
I. OPENING THE TACKLEBOX: THE BACKGROUND ON THE GULF RED 
SNAPPER FISHERY 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the Gulf red 
snapper, scientific name Lutjanus campechanus, was commonly confused 
with other snapper species, such as the Caribbean red snapper, Lutjanus 
purpureus.13 Despite the difference in species, the term “red snapper” was 
usually used in reference to the former, because Gulf red snapper were 
known as the superb caliber of fish.14 In the 1960s, the distinction between 
the different species—and the inherent eminence of the Gulf red 
snapper—became apparent. Nevertheless, fishermen began to use the 
generic term “red snapper” to refer to all types of red snapper.15 Regardless 
of potential misnomers, the Gulf red snapper maintains prominence as 
arguably the most sought after fish, yielding the greatest economic impact 
on both the recreational and commercial fishing industries,16 which in turn 
provide billions of dollars to the economies of Gulf Coast communities 
each year.17 
                                                                                                             
 13. JOSEPH E. TASHIRO, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SUBJECT INDICES 
FOR WESTERN ATLANTIC SNAPPERS (LUTJANIDAE), 3 (1979), available at http: 
//www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/tm/sefc/sefc008.pdf. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Red Snapper (Lutjanus Campechanus), GULF COAST MARINE LIFE CENTER, 
http://www.gcmlc.com/species-finfish-red_snapper.php [https://perma.cc/E5DV-
ERME] (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (“Red snapper is the most economically important 
fish in the Gulf of Mexico for both the commercial and recreational fishing 
industries.”); see also HARTE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 10 (“Red snapper 
represents a vital economic commodity . . . and supports highly lucrative commercial 
and recreational fisheries.”). 
 17. Landrieu: Nine-Day Red Snapper Season Hurts Fishermen and Gulf 
Economy, COASTAL CONSERVATION ASS’N, http://www.ccalouisiana.com/cca11 
/index.php/press-room-60/press-releases/555-landrieu-nine-day-red-snapper-season-
hurts-fishermen-and-gulf-economy [https://perma.cc/FP4U-92JC] (last visited Jan. 
29, 2016). 
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A. The Spawning: A Brief History of Gulf Red Snapper Fishing 
Fishing efforts for red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico began in the 
1840s in the northwestern portion of the Gulf;18 by 1872, the red snapper 
fishery constituted its own self-sustaining industry.19 With the increased 
prevalence of ice and trains for transport in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, the harvesting of red snapper greatly increased—in the 
early 1900s, it was not uncommon for total annual Gulf red snapper 
landings to exceed ten million pounds.20 Because increased fishing 
depleted red snapper in local waters, fishermen began expanding their 
fishing voyages to other areas of the Gulf.21 Soon thereafter, tourism in the 
Gulf states, the production of fiberglass boats, and the improvement in 
boat motor technology in the mid-twentieth century greatly increased 
recreational fishing activity in the Gulf.22 This proliferation of sport 
fishermen led to an astronomical spike in the annual recreational 
harvesting of red snapper, from an estimated 50,000 pounds to over five 
million pounds between World War II and the 1990s.23 
Unfortunately, consistent, reliable data pertaining to pre-1981 
recreational red snapper harvests is difficult to determine on a year-by-
year basis.24 Nevertheless, it is without question that red snapper 
harvesting reached its climax in the 1960s.25 Subsequent harvests would 
not reflect continued growth at the same rate as in years prior due to a new 
fishing prohibition in foreign waters and a trending decrease in the size of 
Gulf snapper.26 
                                                                                                             
 18. PETER B. HOOD ET AL., A History of Red Snapper Management in the 
Gulf of Mexico, in RED SNAPPER: ECOLOGY AND FISHERIES IN THE U.S. GULF OF 
MEXICO, 1 (2007), available at http://web.fisheries.org/proofs/red/hood.pdf. 
 19. B.J. GALLAWAY ET AL., Estimates of Shrimp Trawl Bycatch of Red Snapper 
(Lutjanus campechanus) in the Gulf of Mexico, in FISHERY STOCK ASSESSMENT 
MODELS, ALASKA SEA GRANT COLLEGE PROGRAM, 817, 818 (1998), available at 
http://nsgl.gso.uri.edu/aku/akuw97002/akuw97002_part9.pdf. 
 20. Hood et al., supra note 18. 
 21. Id. 
 22. JOHN F. WALTER, BACKCALCULATION OF RECREATIONAL CATCH OF RED 
GROUPER FROM 1945 TO 1985, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Services, Southeast Fisheries 
Science Center, SEDAR12-DW15 Contribution (July 2006), 3, available at http: 
//sedarweb.org/docs/wpapers/S12%20DW15%20BackCalc%20rec%20catch.pdf. 
 23. SEDAR 7, Stock assessment of SEDAR 7: Gulf of Mexico red snapper, 
Southeast Data, Assessment, and Review, Charleston, S.C., 480 (2005). See also 
Hood et al., supra note 18, at 1–2. 
 24. Hood et al., supra note 18, at 1–2. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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B. Casting the Sinking Net: The Administrative and Legal Authority 
Under which the Gulf Red Snapper Fishery Floats 
Operating under the United States Department of Commerce and the 
Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is the federal agency responsible 
for the management and conservation of the nation’s oceanic species.27 
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is the national office of 
the NOAA controlling fishery management.28 In conjunction with regional 
councils, the NMFS is charged with overseeing federal fishery 
management plans and ensuring proper regulation of United States 
territorial waters.29 
In 1976, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (MSA) to govern fishery management 
in United States federal waters.30 Commonly referred to as the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ), United States federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico 
extend from the end of state waters outward two hundred nautical miles.31 
Legislators passed the MSA for several purposes: (1) to conserve and 
manage fisheries in the waters surrounding the United States, (2) to foster 
commercial and recreational fishing industries with appropriate 
management standards, and (3) to implement fishery management plans 
that maintain the optimum yield of fisheries while complying with national 
standards.32 The MSA operates in accordance with ten “national 
standards” to keep the goals of fishery management in view while 
implementing legislation.33 Attempting to properly conserve and preserve 
oceanic species, while also allowing fishermen to utilize the oceans’ 
natural resources by harvesting these species, proves a daunting and 
difficult task. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
has opined that the “legal framework Congress established to direct the 
management of fish stocks is of necessity multifaceted, specific, and 
complex.”34 
                                                                                                             
 27. 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (2010). 
 28. Niki Pace, Ecosystem-Based Management under the Magnuson-Stevens 
Act: Managing the Competing Interests of the Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper and 
Shrimp Fisheries, 2 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 1, 3 (2009). 
 29. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 
90 Stat. 348 at Sec. 302(b)(1)(B); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(1)(B). 
 30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–84 (2013). 
 31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 5102(6), 1802(11), 1811(a). 
 32. Guindon v. Pritzker, 31 F. Supp.3d 169, 175 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2014); see 
also 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b). 
 33. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a). 
 34. Guindon, 31 F. Supp.3d at 175 (describing the provisions of the MSA). 
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In order to assist the NMFS in the implementation of fishery 
management and regulation, the MSA established eight federal regional 
councils to aid in the administration of each respective region’s fisheries.35 
These regional councils of the NOAA are charged with developing fishery 
management plans (FMPs) for each fishery over which they bear authority, 
respectively.36 Once each regional council submits FMPs, FMP 
amendments, or proposed regulations to the Secretary of Commerce, the 
Secretary evaluates the plans and ensures that they align with the 
provisions of the MSA and other pertinent laws.37 The Secretary, operating 
through the NMFS, then has thirty days to approve, partially approve, or 
deny the proposed plans or regulations.38 
The Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management Council (Gulf Council) is 
the regional chapter of the NOAA that regulates the fisheries of the Gulf 
of Mexico.39 The Gulf Council has federal jurisdiction over the Gulf 
coastal regions of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas.40 
Pursuant to section 303(a)(15) of the MSA, FMPs must establish 
mechanisms for identifying annual catch limits41 while also implementing 
regulations to prevent overfishing––including accountability measures.42 
Section 407(d) of the MSA, applying exclusively to the Gulf of Mexico 
red snapper fishery,43 dictates that FMPs—or any amendments thereto—
must create separate recreational and commercial fishing quotas that, once 
reached, place a prohibition on any future harvesting of red snapper for the 
rest of the fishing year.44 
When contemplating whether to enact certain regulations or FMPs, the 
Gulf Council analyzes the Southeast Data, Assessment, and Review 
(SEDAR) stock evaluation to review the status of the red snapper 
population.45 SEDAR stock assessments gauge information on the red 
snapper’s average weight, spawning habits, mortality rates, overall 
                                                                                                             
 35. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1). 
 36. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1). 
 37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1854(a), 1851(a), 1854(b)(1). 
 38. 16 U.S.C. §1854(a)(3). 
 39. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(E). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Annual Catch Limits (ACL) represent the amount of fishing that the 
NMFS permits each year. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 177. 
 42. Accountability Measures (AM) are “management controls to prevent 
ACLs, including sector–ACLs, from being exceeded, and to correct or mitigate 
overages of the ACL if they occur. AMs should address and minimize both the 
frequency and magnitude of overages and correct the problem that caused the 
overage in as short a time as possible.” 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(g)(1)(2013); see also 
16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(15). 
 43. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 176; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1853. 
 44. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 176; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1883(d)(1). 
 45. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 178. 
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population, and other factors indicating the size and health of the fishery.46 
The Council utilizes these assessments to determine whether to develop 
new FMPs or to amend existing regulations.47 
II. CHUMMING THE WATER: FEDERAL REGULATION OF GULF RED 
SNAPPER 
Federal management of Gulf red snapper is a relatively modern 
regulatory scheme, beginning in the late twentieth century. In the past 
decade or so, SEDAR assessments, along with other studies and reports, 
have prompted a dynamic trend of federal red snapper regulations 
attempting to efficiently manage the species. 
A. The First Bite: Background on Gulf Red Snapper Regulations 
Initial regulations were imposed on the red snapper fishery in the 
1980s due to reports regarding the unhealthy status of the red snapper 
fishery.48 By-catch—the incidental and inadvertent catching of red 
snapper in shrimping nets—was the impetus for imposing the initial 
regulations on Gulf snapper.49 With the expansion of the Gulf shrimping 
industry in the 1960s, large amounts of juvenile red snapper were killed in 
shrimp trawl nets, resulting in the decline of the overall red snapper 
population.50 This decline prompted the creation of the original 
management structure of the red snapper fishery.51 
From the early 1980s until 2009, SEDAR conducted red snapper 
population assessments. In 2009, a SEDAR study reported that the 
management standards were effectively rebuilding the population.52 
According to the report, overfishing—the phenomenon occurring when the 
rate at which fish are removed from the water due to fishing is too high—had 
                                                                                                             
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Gloria Godsell and Mary Penny Thompson, Issues Surrounding the Gulf 
of Mexico Red Snapper Fishery and the Impact of the Magnuson Act 
Reauthorization, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 268–70 (1996). 
 49. Id. Restrictions have since been implemented to prevent by-catch, so that 
this phenomenon no longer predominates as a primary concern pertinent to red 
snapper management and rebuilding. 
 50. GULF OF MEXICO FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN 
FOR THE SHRIMP FISHERY OF THE GULF OF MEXICO, UNITED STATES WATERS, 3-110 
(1981), available at http://gulfcouncil.org/docs/amendments/SHRIMP%20FMP 
%20Final%201981-11.pdf. 
 51. Godsell, supra note 48. 
 52. See SEDAR, Stock Assessment of Red Snapper in the Gulf of Mexico: 
SEDAR Update Assessment (2009). 
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ceased.53 That assertion found further support in a 2013 assessment by the 
NMFS, which revealed that overfishing was not occurring and catch limits 
could therefore increase; however, that same report stated that although the 
stock was rebuilding, the fishery remained overfished—meaning, that, despite 
no active overfishing taking place, the population numbers of the stock had 
not rebounded and were still too low.54 
Because of the success of the rebuilding process, the catch limits of 
Gulf red snapper have steadily increased in recent years. The catch limit 
for both the commercial and recreational sectors in 2008 and 2009 was 
five million pounds; by 2013, the limit increased to eleven million pounds, 
thanks largely to the attainment of rebuilding objectives.55 As large as that 
increase may seem, the NMFS further stated that the limit could have 
potentially soared to 13.5 million pounds in 2013, but regulators refrained 
from setting such a liberal limit because doing so would necessitate a 
deduction for the 2014 and 2015 seasons.56 
B. The Receding Tide: Gulf Red Snapper Regulations Through the 2014 
Season 
Red snapper fishery management has generally been split into two 
divisions: the commercial sector and the recreational sector. Prior to the 
commencement of the red snapper season, the Council would use the 
upcoming year’s projected Acceptable Biological Catch57 (ABC) to propose 
a per annum quota.58 The recreational and commercial sectors would each be 
awarded an allocation of the total Gulf red snapper quota.59 The commercial 
sector has received, and continues to receive, fifty-one percent of the overall 
quota, with the remaining forty-nine percent allocated to the recreational 
sector.60 However, if enacted, Amendment 28 to the Fishery Management 
Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico may reallocate this 
proportion of the quota to reflect a recreational to commercial ratio of 51.5 to 
                                                                                                             
 53. See id. 
 54. See SEDAR, SEDAR 31: Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper Stock Assessment 
Report (2013). 
 55. See FINAL AMENDMENT 40, supra note 10, at 35. 
 56. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 182. 
 57. Acceptable Biological Catch (ABC) is “an annual catch figure, set at or 
below the OFL [Overfishing Limit], with the difference between the OFL and the 
ABC designed to account for scientific uncertainty in the SSC’s [Scientific and 
Statistical Committee] calculation of the OFL . . . . ABC is an expression of the 
amount of fish that fishermen could harvest during a particular year without 
overfishing the stock, with accommodation for scientific uncertainty.” Guindon, 
31 F. Supp. 3d at 177; see 50 C.F.R. §§ 600.310(f)(2) (ii)(2013). 
 58. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 178. 
 59. 16 U.S.C. § 1883(d). 
 60. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 178; see 50 C.F.R. § 622.21. 
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48.5 percent, respectively.61 The Gulf Council based this decision on the 
results of a 2014 red snapper assessment update and alleged that this 
reallocation of the quota will better serve each sector’s needs.62 Amendment 
28 is currently under a public comment period. 
1. Commercial Fishing Regulations 
Since 2007, the commercial sector has been regulated according to an 
“individual fishing quota” (IFQ).63 Under this program, commercial 
fisherman must apply for an IFQ allocation, which is the amount of Gulf 
red snapper that a commercial fisherman is authorized to possess, land, or 
sell per year.64 This allocation is determined by “multiplying a 
shareholder’s IFQ share times the annual commercial quota for Gulf red 
snapper.”65 The IFQ management measure has appropriately regulated the 
commercial red snapper fishing industry and prevented a quota overrun 
because “each IFQ allocation holder is strictly monitored to ensure they 
do not land more fish than pounds allocated to them through the 
program.”66 In fact, the IFQ program has been so effective in regulating 
the commercial red snapper fishing sector that the 2010 Amendment to the 
Reef Fish FMP states “there is no possibility of a quota overrun for the 
commercial sector.”67 Since the commercial sector is effectively regulated 
without the potential for quota overruns, the current issues in red snapper 
management must by necessity stem from the inadequacies of recreational 
red snapper regulations that fail to impede quota overruns, thereby 
obstructing equitable access to the federal red snapper fishery for certain 
fishermen. 
                                                                                                             
 61. GULF OF MEXICO FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, RED SNAPPER ALLOCATION: 
FINAL AMENDMENT 28 TO THE FISHERY MGMT. PLAN FOR THE REEF FISH 
RESOURCES OF THE GULF OF MEXICO, 18 (2015), available at http://gulf 
council.org/docs/amendments/Final%20Red%20Snapper%20Allocation%20-RF  
%20Amendment%2028.pdf. 
 62. Id. at 4. 
 63. Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) is defined as “a Federal permit under a 
limited access system to harvest a quantity of fish, expressed by a unit or units 
representing a percentage of the total allowable catch of a fishery that may be 
received or held for exclusive use by a person.” 16 U.S.C. § 1802(23). The 
Regional Administrator (RA) issues shares equivalent to a percentage of the 
annual commercial red snapper quota based on pertinent historical landings. 
These shares comprise the Gulf Red Snapper IFQ allocation that is permitted for 
each commercial fisherman. See 50 C.F.R. § 622.16.  
 64. 50 C.F.R. § 622.21(a). 
 65. Id. at (a)(4). 
 66. FINAL AMENDMENT 40, supra note 10, at 1; see also Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 
3d at 178. 
 67. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 178. 
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2. Recreational Fishing Regulations Through the 2014 Season 
Before the enactment of Amendment 40, the recreational sector was 
awarded a portion of the year’s overall red snapper quota and was 
regulated by its quota,68 a bag limit,69 a size limit,70 and fishing seasons.71 
The only accountability measure implemented in recreational red snapper 
regulations was the in-season closure.72 The recreational sector of the red 
snapper fishery was composed of two entities: private anglers/vessels73 
and for-hire vessels.74 These two groups had to abide by the bag limit, size 
limit, and closed season regulations; additionally, they had to collectively 
remain within the bounds of the recreational quota. An important factor 
distinguishing the two recreational bodies rested in private angler’s ability 
to fish for red snapper in federal waters when the federal season was open, 
and in state waters when the state season was open.75 By contrast, for-hire 
operators had to abide by the length of the federal season in procuring their 
annual harvest and, hence, could only fish for red snapper while the federal 
season was open.76 Furthermore, in 2004, the NMFS placed a moratorium 
on the issuance of new federal for-hire reef fish permits.77 As a result, for-
hire vessels today consist only of those who were federal for-hire operators 
prior to 2004.78 Since the moratorium was issued, the number of private 
recreational vessels has increased, and the number of federal for-hire 
operators has decreased.79 Because of the disparity between the number of 
private and for-hire vessels and the private vessels’ ability to fish in state 
                                                                                                             
 68. See 50 C.F.R. § 622.21. 
 69. See 50 C.F.R. § 622.38(b)(3). 
 70. See 50 C.F.R. § 622.37(a)(1). 
 71. See 50 C.F.R. § 622.34(b) (stating the recreational sector season in the 
EEZ closes from January 1 through May 31). “NMFS estimates in advance how 
long it will take for the recreational sector to harvest its quota, based on historical 
data, then sets the season length according to that projection.” Guindon, 31 F. 
Supp. 3d at 178-79. 
 72. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 178-79; 78 Fed. Reg. at 17883; Accountability 
measures are “management controls to prevent ACLs, including sector–ACLs, 
from being exceeded, and to correct or mitigate overages of the ACL if they 
occur.” 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(g)(1). 
 73. FINAL AMENDMENT 40, supra note 10, at x (describing private vessels as 
vessels fishing for sport or pleasure without a federal reef-fish permit). 
 74. Id. (describing for-hire vessels as vessels fishing for sport or pleasure with 
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waters, private vessel harvesting of red snapper has accounted for a greater 
proportion of the recreational quota as a whole.80 
III. TANGLING LINES DURING A FEEDING FRENZY: INITIAL LITIGATION, 
THE 2014 SEASON, AND THE CHAOTIC STATE OF GULF RED SNAPPER 
MANAGEMENT 
In 2012, an amendment to the Reef Fish FMP generated total red 
snapper quotas for the 2012 and 2013 seasons for both commercial and 
recreational fishermen.81 The 2012 total quota was set at 8.08 million 
pounds, and the 2013 total quota was fixed at 8.69 million pounds.82 The 
amendment also provided that, if the 2012 ABC was exceeded during the 
2012 season, the 2012 quota would remain in place for the 2013 season.83 
The recreational sector exceeded its quota in 2012 by 1.187 million 
pounds, yet the GMFMC inexplicably chose to set the 2013 quota at 8.46 
million pounds instead of again utilizing the 2012 quota as the 2012 
amendment demanded.84 The Council did not set any future quotas because 
of a new SEDAR stock assessment that was to be produced later in 2013.85 
In response to the NMFS’s actions, the five states under GMFMC’s 
authority planned to implement season lengths and bag limits that were 
less stringent than the proposed federal regulations.86 The NMFS then 
issued an emergency rule in March 2013 that enacted state closure dates 
for the recreational sector.87 Two months later, a “May Final Rule” 
implemented the 8.46 million pound (mp) quota88 and imposed season 
closure dates for each Gulf state.89 The District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas found that the rule was inconsistent with the requisite 
emergency ruling criteria measures and held the state-specific season 
closure dates to be a violation of 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(4).90 After the district 
court vacated the rule,91 the NMFS set a Gulf-wide recreational sector 
closure date and maintained the 8.46 mp quota.92 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. at x–xi. 
 81. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 181. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 181. 
 88. 4.315 mp commercial quota and 4.145 mp recreational quota. 
 89. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 181. 
 90. Id. (citing Texas v. Crabtree, 948 F. Supp. 2d 676, 690 (S.D. Tex. 2013)). 
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In July 2013, the Council devised two more proposals for the 2013 red 
snapper season.93 The Council wanted to increase the 2013 overall quota 
and then, depending on the availability of unused quota, reopen the season 
in the fall.94 The NMFS obtained landing estimates from the Marine 
Recreational Information Program95 (MRIP) in late August that revealed 
an overage exceeding both the current and proposed quota.96 Despite these 
discoveries, the NMFS still proceeded to reopen the season in the fall.97 
A. Setting the Hook: Guindon v. Pritzker 
By 2014, the recreational fishing sector had exceeded its red snapper 
quota in six out of the past seven seasons.98 In response, commercial 
fishermen filed suit99 against the Secretary, the NOAA, the NMFS, and the 
Coastal Conservation Association (CCA)100 alleging that the May Final 
Rule and June Temporary Rule of 2013 violated multiple provisions of the 
MSA.101 In Guindon v. Pritzker, the commercial fishermen contended that 
inadequate regulatory measures in the Gulf red snapper recreational sector, 
as well as consistent recreational quota overruns, posed negative effects—
both current and prospective—on their industry.102 
The CCA countered that these commercial fishermen lacked Article 
III standing, that their claims were moot, and that they did not properly 
raise their concerns with the NMFS according to regulatory procedure.103 
The District Court for the District of Columbia disagreed with each of the 
CCA’s defenses,104 finding that commercial red snapper fishermen could 
appropriately challenge these actions because the overharvesting of red 
snapper could negatively affect both sectors’ interests in the health of the 
fishery.105 Plaintiffs demonstrated that overages in the recreational sector 
could affect the plan for “constant catch” in future years,106 and the court 
                                                                                                             
 93. Id. at 193. 
 94. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 193–94. 
 95. MRIP is “the primary data source for estimating” the total weight of red 
snapper landed by recreational fishermen. Id. at 179. 
 96. Id. at 183. 
 97. Id. at 193. 
 98. Id. at 188. 
 99. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia. 
 100. CCA was a defendant-intervenor in the suit. 
 101. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 192. 
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 103. Id. at 186. 
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 106. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d. 
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held that overharvesting was directly traceable to the NMFS’s actions.107 
The Guindon court also determined that plaintiffs’ claims were rooted in 
the exact kind of agency actions for which the “capable-of-repetition-yet-
evading-review” exception exists, as the recreational sector had exceeded 
its allotted quota in six out of the past seven years. Given the short notice 
of the emergency rules, these actions fell under that exception.108 
With no prior jurisprudence guiding the issue, the Guindon court 
interpreted section 407(d) of the MSA to require that the NMFS close the 
season, without the ability to reopen it, once it was determined that the quota 
had been reached.109 As of 2013, the agency had experienced years of 
recreational quota overruns, and the NMFS should have acknowledged that 
its process in incrementally shortening the season was not working.110 The 
court opined, in dicta, that the NMFS could comply with the requirements of 
section 407(a) by enacting a regulation prohibiting the retention of fish above 
the quota (including setting an accurate and conservative season length in 
advance based on a projection of when the quota would likely be met—i.e., a 
dramatically shortened season), a buffer, or some other strategy.111 
The NMFS attempted to defend reopening the season despite 
excessive harvests by arguing that if it had the technology of MRIP 
landings, it would have originally set a more accurate, higher quota and 
ABC for the 2013 quota.112 The Guindon court found this argument to be 
without merit, and it instead held that the NMFS, by its very failure to use 
the best scientific technology available, had violated a national standard 
set forth in the MSA.113 In other words, the NMFS should not have 
reopened the red snapper season in the fall absent utilization of the MRIP 
landings technology. 
Additionally, the NMFS erred, according to the Guindon court, in 
failing to impose any accountability measures in accordance with section 
303(a)(15) of the MSA.114 While the Council’s Scientific and Statistical 
Committee (SSC) had recommended an added buffer for the recreational 
sector quota due to the uncertainty and management disparities between 
the recreational and commercial sectors,115 the Council did not accept the 
buffer regulation—and the NMFS wrongfully approved that omission.116 
The court chose not to stipulate which accountability measures would have 
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been appropriate, leaving that determination to the discretion of agency 
experts.117 
Finally, the Guindon court held that the NMFS violated section 304(b) 
and National Standard 4 of the MSA by deciding to ignore the already 
exceeded recreational quota and reopen the red snapper season during the 
fall.118 That violation contravened the terms of the FMP by failing to 
reflect the 51:49 allocation split between the commercial and recreational 
sectors. National Standard 4 was violated in not providing an equitable 
allocation of fishing privileges to all fishermen.119 
B. Setting the Drag Too Tight: The 2014 Recreational Red Snapper 
Season 
In May of 2014, the NMFS declared a conservatory and managerial 
need to issue a temporary “emergency” rule bearing on the 2014 Gulf of 
Mexico red snapper recreational season.120 In its ruling, the GMFMC 
issued a nine-day recreational season based on the Annual Catch Target 
(ACT), which would run from June 1 to June 9, 2014, as well as a twenty 
percent buffer.121 The GMFMC openly stated that the emergency ruling 
was issued to prevent a recreational quota overrun, in response to the 
interpretation of MSA provisions under Guindon.122 
More specifically, the NMFS’s 2014 emergency ruling123 responded 
to dicta in Guindon, wherein the court opined that an effective regulatory 
measure to prevent a recreational quota overrun might take the form of a 
dramatically shortened federal recreational red snapper season.124 In an 
effort to avoid litigation similar to Guindon, the GMFMC enacted the 2014 
emergency rule to abide by the MSA and curb recreational quota overruns. 
                                                                                                             
 117. Id. at 200. 
 118. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 195. 
 119. Id. at 200. 
 120. 2014 Limited Commercial and Recreational Fishing Seasons for Red 
Snapper in the Southern Atlantic States, 79 Fed. Reg. 32,496, 32,497 (June 5, 2014). 
 121. Id. at 32,496. 
 122. Gulf of Mexico 2014 Recreational Red Snapper Season Final Emergency 
Rule––Accountability Measures: Frequently Asked Questions, NATIONAL MARINE 
FISHERIES SERVICE (May 2014), http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sustainable 
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C. Spooling: The Disarray in Federal Management of Gulf Red Snapper 
Prompting Change 
Though the Council’s ruling may have helped in preventing a 
recreational sector overrun, the extremely short recreational federal season 
left many anglers outraged. Furious fishermen demanded answers: Why 
restrict federal seasons so severely when the red snapper population was—
and remains—healthy enough for the catch limit to increase every year? 
The NMFS attempted to answer that question—and justify the 
truncated federal season—on the grounds that the rate of recreational catch 
continues to increase.125 In recent years, recreational fishermen caught 
eight times as many pounds of Gulf red snapper as they did before the 
population began to recover, and three to four times the 2007 rate.126 While 
the catch limit increased by 120 percent from 2009 to 2013, recreational 
catches increased by 800 percent per day.127 Furthermore, the amount of 
fish caught in state waters has increased tremendously in the past five to 
eight years.128 The NMFS concluded that, because of the increased catch 
rates and the growing amount of red snapper harvested in state waters, the 
federal season must be shortened in order to adequately manage the 
fishery.129 As such, the measure, in some ways, seems an unavoidable 
necessity to the Council’s prevention of quota overruns and future 
litigation. 
Unappeased by that rationale, recreational fishermen have continued 
to voice strong opposition to the extremely stringent standards imposed on 
the 2014 season. The controversy surrounding the short season has created 
massive rifts between commercial and recreational fishermen, as well as 
between federal and state agencies. 
At its essence, the main problem with the current management of Gulf 
red snapper is two-fold. First, the Council has instituted shorter federal 
recreational red snapper seasons each year because of the rapid increase in 
which recreational fishermen are filling the quota. Because of the length 
of recent federal seasons, private and for-hire anglers have been extremely 
limited as to the amount of time in which they may fish in federal waters. 
Second, shorter federal recreational seasons have increased private 
anglers’ fishing efforts in state waters and have actually exacerbated the 
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management problem because more of the quota is being fulfilled by 
private anglers in state waters when federal waters are closed. The social 
result has been: (1) for-hire operators’ discontent with their lack of 
equitable access to the fishery compared to private anglers, and (2) private 
and for-hire operators’ frustration with the narrow time period in which 
they can fish in federal waters. The more important results are private 
anglers expending a disproportionate amount of the recreational quota 
compared to the federal for-hire operators, and recreational landings 
consistently exceeding the recreational quota year after year. 
Although red snapper fishery management has been a “mess” for 
several years, the stringency of the 2014 regulations infuriated Gulf 
fishermen enough to cause them to demand immediate action.130 Many 
anglers have asserted that the nine-day recreational season restricted 
access to an abundant natural resource—the limitation was not the result 
of necessary conservation efforts but instead flowed from the fact that the 
overall management of the fishery remains in utter disarray.131 Knowing 
that a better management approach is essential to the future of the red 
snapper industry in the Gulf of Mexico, the NMFS and the GMFMC 
approved Amendment 40 to aid in the resolution of the problem.132 
IV. POPPING THE LINE: AMENDMENT 40, THE 2015 SEASON, AND 
RECENT LITIGATION 
In response to the recent red snapper controversy, the GMFMC 
convened on October 23, 2014 to approve Amendment 40. On April 10, 
2015, the NMFS approved the amendment and it was subsequently 
published as a Final Rule in the Federal Register.133 Effective May 22, 
2015, Amendment 40 institutes distinct private angling and federal for-
hire components within the recreational red snapper fishery and allocates 
red snapper resources between the two recreational divisions.134 The 
NMFS claims that establishing these two divisions provides a basis for 
                                                                                                             
 130. David Cresson, Guest Commentary: Gulf Fishery Management a Huge 
Mess, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, (Aug. 28, 2014), http://theadvocate.com/news 
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flexible management of red snapper tailored to fit each division.135 The 
plan purports to reduce the probability of a recreational quota overrun by 
attempting to produce the optimum yield of red snapper while also aiding 
in the rebuilding of the red snapper species.136 The amendment also 
contains a three-year sunset provision and establishes separate red snapper 
season closures for each component of the recreational sector.137 
A. Tying a Quick, Loose Knot in Attempting to Catch One Quickly: 
Amendment 40 
Under the provisions of the amendment, the recreational sector is split 
into two subdivisions – federal for-hire anglers and private anglers.138 The 
federal for-hire group is composed of anglers with federal charter vessel 
permits; private anglers include private vessel anglers and state-permitted 
for-hire vessels.139 The amendment allocates 42.3 percent of the quota to 
the for-hire component and the remaining 57.7 percent to private 
anglers.140 Seasons for both components of the recreational sector will 
commence on June 1, and the length of each component’s season will be 
based upon the ACT, with a twenty percent buffer.141 The sunset clause in 
the amendment provides that recreational sector separation will cease at 
the end of 2017, unless federal agencies take further action.142 
B. A Short Fight: The 2015 Season 
The total recreational quota for the 2015 season was 7.01 million 
pounds.143 The final ACT for the for-hire component was 2.371 mp and 
3.234 mp for private anglers.144 Based on these numbers, the private angler 
season lasted from June 1–10, 2015, and the for-hire season lasted June 1–
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14, 2015.145 The bag limit was two fish with a 16-inch minimum total 
length size limit.146 
C. Threading the Eyelets of Amendment 40: The Aims of the Amendment 
The Council has stated that, regardless of whether the recreational 
sector is maintained as a single entity or divided into two components, the 
overall recreational quota will not change, and fishing activity will, 
therefore, most likely remain consistent.147 However, the Council predicts 
that the implementation of sector separation could affect a potential shift 
in private angling fishing activity from federal to state waters because state 
and federal snapper seasons would remain inconsistent.148 In addition, the 
Council reports that private anglers’ unfair access to red snapper over the 
for-hire component would persist, again because of competition between 
federal seasons and their more liberal state counterparts.149 The alleged 
benefit that for-hire operators would receive in exchange would be more 
equitable access to the red snapper fishery through the issuance of separate 
quotas and seasons for each newly divided component.150 Interestingly, the 
Council admits that the potential benefits that sector separation offers to 
for-hire operators “could be decreased should the amount of red snapper 
harvested in state waters outside the federal season increase.”151 In other 
words, private anglers might fulfill or exceed the recreational quota in state 
waters before the federal seasons start; thus, the entire red snapper quota 
would be caught in state waters. Although the provisions of Amendment 
40 were active during the 2015 season, the true effects of the amendment 
will likely not be seen until all of the data is compiled over the next few 
years. 
D. Attempting to Net the Monster: 2015 Litigation 
Attempting to invalidate Amendment 40, CCA members filed suit 
against the Department of Commerce, the NOAA, the NMFS, and a for-
hire fishing association in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana in the spring of 2015.152 The CCA alleged that the 
implementation of Amendment 40 will injure them “because it will reduce 
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the maximum quantity of red snapper that individual recreational 
fisherman can catch.”153 
The CCA made four legal arguments for invalidating Amendment 40,154 
asserting that: (1) Amendment 40 violates the MSA by regulating charter and 
for-hire fishermen independently from private anglers; (2) the NMFS and the 
GMFMC violated both federal statute and National Standard 8 by failing to 
assess, specify, and analyze the economic and social effects of Amendment 
40; (3) Amendment 40 violates National Standard 4 by effectuating an unfair 
and inequitable allocation of fishery resources; and (4) Amendment 40 
establishes an improper delegation of the GMFMC’s authority by authorizing 
the NMFS to determine allocation levels.155  
After both plaintiffs and defendants moved for summary judgment, 
Judge Milazzo ruled in favor of the defendants in January of 2016.156 
While discussions of a potential appeal are circulating, it seems rather 
unlikely that courts will find Amendment 40 is invalid. Despite its 
apparent legal validity, Amendment 40 does not offer the long-term 
solution needed in Gulf red snapper management. While the Amendment 
remains in effect, more prudent solutions should be contemplated to ensure 
appropriate long-term regulations for the fishery. 
E. Popped Line: Why Amendment 40 is Not the Permanent Solution 
Regulatory management schemes raise major concerns for private 
vessels, for-hire operators, and the Council, as proper apportionment of 
the red snapper quota between the two recreational components is crucial. 
Amendment 40 attempts to resolve this problem, but, while it may deliver 
some prospective benefits, it fails to provide the requisite long-term 
solution needed for the Gulf red snapper fishery. 
The only accountability measure included in pre-Amendment 40 
regulations––federal season closure––has proven unsuccessful in 
preventing recreational quota overruns, primarily because of private 
anglers’ ability to fish for red snapper in state waters. As seen in past years, 
the recreational sector has exceeded its quota under a variety of different 
management measures, and sector separation does not provide any 
concrete solution to this problem. Though the amendment will apportion 
the quota between the two divided sectors, the only accountability measure 
remains season closures—a mechanism that on its own has proven 
ineffective. Theoretically, the provisions of Amendment 40 will aid in 
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curing the aforementioned problems by apportioning the quota between 
the two new recreational components and instituting separate seasons, so 
that for-hire and private anglers are afforded more equitable timeframe in 
which to fulfill their quota. However, both private and federal for-hire 
anglers can still potentially exceed their quotas, even with separate 
seasons. Furthermore, although the amendment may quell the for-hire 
versus private angler competition during the federal season by awarding 
for-hire operators their own quota and season, private anglers will still 
enjoy the advantage of access to red snapper in state waters, even when 
their own federal season is closed. 
Though Amendment 40 may effectively alleviate some of the issues 
in Gulf red snapper fishing, it fails to guarantee any comprehensive 
solution. While the Council asserts that sector separation will create 
unique management approaches for each division, “potentially resulting in 
increases in economic value,”157 the magnitude of these economic benefits 
depends upon what kind of management measures are enacted.158 These 
economic impacts, though potentially beneficial, are not supported by 
concrete data evincing future economic gains for either sector. 
Many private anglers also allege that Amendment 40 marks the 
beginning of the privatization of the recreational red snapper fishery.159 
Their assertion rests on the assumption that a few wealthy for-hire 
operators will eventually “buy out” most of the other for-hire operators. 
Because of the new allocation of the recreational quota under Amendment 
40, these few for-hire operators could then monopolize access to Gulf red 
snapper.160 Critics worry that private anglers fishing for red snapper will 
eventually be forced out of federal waters and will only be able to gain 
access to the fish there by paying the few for-hire operators controlling the 
industry.161 
Like the mule deer hunting permits discussed in the opening paragraph 
of this article, sector separation creates a “pay-to-play” incentive for those 
individuals with sufficient resources. In so doing, Amendment 40 by 
necessity deprives equitable access to anglers of more meager means. This 
scenario hardly seems fair, but the speculative, extreme nature of this 
hypothetical, as applied in the context of the red snapper industry, render 
such a monopoly implausible, at least to some extent. 
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Furthermore, Amendment 40 contains a “sunset clause,” whereby the 
amendment will phase out after three years absent a Council vote to re-
enact it.162 This provision has purportedly been Amendment 40’s saving 
grace, being the only reason why some Gulf states chose to vote for it.163 
With the benefit of the sunset provision, the aforementioned advantages 
offered by enactment of Amendment 40—particularly the potential 
equitability between the private and for-hire components—can be enjoyed 
without real danger of long-term harm. 
Although Amendment 40 will not resolve the entire recreational 
management problem, it nevertheless promises certain potential benefits. 
By approving Amendment 40, those benefits can begin to take effect while 
a more comprehensive solution to the larger problem is considered. 
V. BREAKING THE SURFACE: A REGIONAL MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
The major issue in red snapper management remains the inadequate 
management measures used to implement and prevent overruns of 
recreational quotas, paired with the continuous and substantial reduction 
of the length of the federal red snapper season. 
As one CCA official commented, if federal red snapper regulations 
continue on this same route, “a situation where private anglers will not be 
allowed in federal waters in the next years” could occur.164 Instead of 
continuing to enact federal regulations that fix short-term problems, the 
NMFS, GMFMC, and the Gulf states must take a step back and evaluate 
red snapper management as a whole. They must then work cooperatively 
to develop management solutions that address all areas of concern within 
the red snapper fishery. 
Amendment 40 has already prompted strong opposition, litigation, 
and rivalry between private and federal for-hire anglers. To combat the 
current insufficient management standards and the fierce discord amongst 
participants in the realm of Gulf recreational red snapper fishing, the most 
prudent course of action requires implementation of a regional 
management standard. 
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A. Selecting the Right Lure: Prospective Regional Management 
Strategies 
In contemplating an effective solution for the Gulf red snapper 
management problem, the Gulf Council has considered several options for 
the appropriate regulation of recreational fishermen while furthering the 
goals of the MSA and the conservation of the red snapper species. Aside 
from the sector separation approach proposed in Amendment 40, other 
possible management strategies include: an allocation shift favoring the 
recreational sector over the commercial sector, a days-at-sea program for 
the for-hire sector, inter-sector trading, a fish tag program, and a for-hire 
IFQ program.165 
The most effective solution to the problem, however, lies in a regional 
management strategy that would allocate regional catch limits among the 
five Gulf states. Under this system, each state would then set its own bag 
limits, size limits, and seasons. Both a 2015 House Bill and an amendment 
to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf 
of Mexico have been considered in order to implement such a regional 
management program, though no final action has been taken on either 
plan. 
1. Amendment 39 
The Council has contemplated institution of a regional management 
strategy for the recreational Gulf red snapper fishery since 2008; however, 
no true headway was made until June of 2012, when the Louisiana 
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries proposed a recreational red snapper 
regional management pilot program.166 In furtherance of that effort, the 
Council developed plans and scoping documents, and, in February of 
2014, released the Final Draft for Amendment 39 to the Fishery 
Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico 
(Amendment 39). Similar to that of Amendment 40, the stated purpose of 
Amendment 39, aims to “provide flexibility in the management of the red 
                                                                                                             
 165. Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Southeast Regional Office, How 
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.noaa.gov/sustainable_fisheries/gulf_fisheries/red_snapper/overview/ [https://perma  
.cc/4S6S-CTAZ] (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
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RESOURCES OF THE GULF OF MEXICO, INCLUDING DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
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snapper recreational component” and to prevent overfishing while 
producing the maximum yield.167 However, Amendment 39 attempts to 
achieve this end by utilizing a regional management strategy, modifying 
for-hire permit provisions, and creating accountability measures for 
recreational sector quota overages for different regions of the Gulf.168 
Amendment 39 contains numerous different actions with multiple 
alternatives for each action. Action 1 of Amendment 39 determines the 
basic structure of regional management.169 While Alternative 1 provides a 
“no action” alternative,170 the Council’s preferred option, Alternative 2, 
would develop a regional management strategy delegating authority to a 
Gulf state, or group thereof, to create regulations pertaining to the 
recreational aspects of the fishery for an allocated portion of the quota.171 
By comparison, Alternative 3 for Action 1 would implement a regional 
management program that would allow the GMFMC to establish distinct 
recreational management measures for certain Gulf regions.172  
Under either Alternative 2 or Alternative 3 to Action 1, red snapper would 
continue to be federally regulated, with the states having limited management 
authority.173 States would only receive full management authority over 
regulations under the provisions of Action 4, discussed infra.174 If the Council 
adopts the preferred state approach in Alternative 2, the regulations chosen 
must be consistent with FMPs and the MSA.175 Alternative 3, on the other 
hand, bears similarities to the no action alternative, in that the Council already 
enjoys the authority to establish specific regional management measures. 
However, the selection of Alternative 3 would signify the Council’s intent to 
implement regional management regulations, as opposed to the currently 
utilized Gulf-wide regulations.176 
The provisions of Action 2 contemplate determination of the regions 
subject to management.177 The Council’s preferred option establishes five 
separate regions––one for each Gulf state.178 Establishing each Gulf state 
as its own region would undoubtedly allow the most pliability in terms of 
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management methods.179 The other provisions of Action 2’s other 
alternatives establish multi-state regions or allow states to determine their 
own regions.180 The implementation of multi-state Gulf regions would 
require those states falling within a given zone to agree on shared 
management measures and season closures.181 
Reportedly, the source of controversy presently delaying passage of 
Amendment 39 lies in Action 3, which contemplates the allocation of the 
recreational red snapper quota amongst the different regions.182 Five 
alternatives for apportionment are stipulated, but the GMFMC has yet to 
choose its preferred alternative.183 
Action 4 entails identification of the regional management measures 
that each region would be allowed to implement under the guise of the 
NMFS and the GMFMC.184 Current federal regulations set forth a daily 
bag limit of two red snapper per angler per day, a of sixteen inch minimum 
total size length limit, and a season start date commencing on June 1, each 
year. Under Action 4, the preferred alternatives of the Council would allow 
the regions to (1) create season structure and start and end dates;185 (2) set 
bag limits ranging from zero to four red snapper per angler per day; (3) 
determine minimum total size length limits between fourteen inches and 
eighteen inches; (4) establish a maximum red snapper size limit; (5) 
cordon off protected areas within the EEZ adjacent to their region;186 and 
(6) institute sub-allocations for the private and for-hire sub-sectors.187 In 
enacting these standards, regions may not create additional fishing days, 
and the measures must be consistent with the region’s projected season 
length and its allocated quota.188 Season dates and structure, bag limits, 
and size limits comprise the obligatory measures that must be set by each 
region; a region’s choices regarding the other six standards are optional.189 
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Action 5 of Amendment 39 concerns restrictions on federal permitted 
for-hire vessels.190 Alternative 1 for that action would maintain the current 
standards, by which federal for-hire operators must comply with federal 
regulations when they are more restrictive than state regulations.191 
Specifically, if federal waters are closed, a Gulf charter-permitted vessel 
cannot simply travel to state waters to harvest red snapper.192 This 
regulation was enacted to ensure federal regulatory compliance and to 
prompt consistent state regulation through its application to commercial 
and for-hire vessels.193 The chance of a landing overage declines when 
federal for-hire operators fishing in state waters are required to abide by 
the more restrictive federal reef fish regulations.194 By comparison, 
Alternative 2 for Action 5 would exclude the provision mandating charter-
permitted operators’ compliance in state waters with the more restrictive 
federal recreational red snapper regulations.195 
However, official action has yet to be taken on Amendment 39, 
allegedly due to the Council’s protracted deliberation on the 
appropriateness of the quotas to be issued to each Gulf state, and the 
Amendment’s status currently remains “on hold.” 
2. H.R. 3094 
In 2013, Senator Mary Landrieu introduced The Gulf of Mexico Red 
Snapper Conservation Act of 2013 in an attempt to institute a regional 
management strategy.196 However, the congressional session ended without 
any final action on the matter, and the bill died in the House. In the summer 
of 2015, Representative Garret Graves introduced his own initiative to transfer 
Gulf red snapper regulatory power to the Gulf states via the Gulf States Red 
Snapper Management Authority Act (H.R. 3094).197 
Under this bill, the Secretary would create a Gulf States Red Snapper 
Management Authority (GSRSMA), which would be composed of the 
“principal fisheries manager of each of the Gulf coastal states.”198 The 
GSRSMA would develop measures to be followed by each Gulf state in 
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regulating red snapper in the waters adjacent to each respective state.199 
Each Gulf state would submit a FMP to the GSRSMA complying with 
section 303(a) of the MSA.200 Each Gulf state’s FMP must consist of 
guidelines and procedures for “the long-term sustainability of Gulf of 
Mexico red snapper based on the best available science.”201 These FMPs 
must also set the recreational quotas consistent with stock assessments for 
the red snapper fishery adjacent to each Gulf state, while also complying 
with the standards set by the GSRSMA.202 After holding a public comment 
period, the GSRSMA would review each state’s FMP and approve them 
if they comply with the requirements set forth by the GSRSMA as well as 
section 303(a) of the MSA.203 
Once the GSRSMA approves a Gulf state’s FMP, the GSRSMA 
would certify to the Secretary that a FMP has been approved.204 The 
Secretary would then revoke any regulations or portions of federal FMPs 
that conflict with the newly approved state FMP and transfer management 
of the Gulf red snapper to the GSRSMA.205 Each Gulf state would then 
assume responsibility for enforcing its approved FMP.206 All federal 
funding would be distributed by the Gulf States Marine Fisheries 
Commission to the Gulf states.207 
Following the transfer of management to the states, the GSRSMA 
must assess whether each Gulf state has properly adopted and 
implemented the approved FMP, and whether the FMP is consistent with 
the previously-set GSRSMA standards and the long-term sustainability of 
the fishery.208 
If, by chance, overfishing occurs, or if the fishery is subject to a 
rebuilding plan in the waters adjacent to a Gulf state, that state must certify 
to the GSRSMA that it enacted the requisite measures to prevent 
overfishing or to rebuild the fishery and that it consulted with the NOAA 
and implemented a data recording program to appropriately monitor such 
state’s harvesting of red snapper.209 In the event that a state does not follow 
these rules, the GSRSMA would then vote on whether to recommend that 
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the Secretary to close the fishery in that state’s Gulf waters.210 The 
Secretary would then have the discretion to close the fishery after 
evaluating the Gulf state’s and the GSRSMA’s comments.211 
Every year, each Gulf state would submit to the GSRSMA a report on 
the fishery in the coastal waters adjacent to each respective state.212 At 
least once every five years, the GSRSMA would, in turn, submit a report 
to the Secretary of Commerce using the information provided in each Gulf 
state’s annual report.213 Additionally, the administrator of the NOAA 
would supply Congress with an annual report of effects of the act.214 
During the three years that this law would be in effect, the Council 
would continue to regulate the commercial sector of the Gulf red snapper 
fishery. The act would not affect the current IFQ regulations in place for 
the commercial sector. 
B. Landing the Tail of a Lifetime: Advantages of the Regional 
Management Strategy over Current Management Standards 
The holding in Guindon exposed the undeniable source of the 
management problems afflicting the entire Gulf of Mexico red snapper 
fishery—ineffective regulation of the recreational snapper-fishing 
sector.215 Those in the commercial sphere have felt the effects flowing 
from the recreational sector’s quota activities. As discussed supra, the 
main problem with current recreational regulations in recent years has 
been short federal seasons coupled with private anglers’ inequitable access 
to red snapper fishing during more liberal state seasons.216 A regional 
management strategy, by allowing states to assess the current status of the 
Gulf fishery across jurisdictional lines, creates a system whereby states 
can accurately implement catch and season limits—in both federal and 
state waters—that will keep the red snapper population healthy and afford 
private anglers and federal for-hire anglers fair access to the fishery. The 
Council, in its attempt to conserve the fishery, has been imposing stricter 
seasons and standards to counteract each Gulf state’s longer red snapper 
season, but the competition has already prompted litigation and retaliation 
by anglers. This fiery feud will likely continue to spiral out of control if 
the fishery is not placed under effective management soon. 
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Some opponents of Amendment 40 claim that the quota standard should 
be done away with altogether,217 but that solution will not properly address 
the problem. The quota standard ensures that anglers can yield the maximum 
amount of landings without imperiling the future of the red snapper species. 
By allowing Gulf states to assess the current state of the fishery, states can set 
appropriate federal and state seasons that work cooperatively to achieve the 
MSA’s goals without the need for the systemic federal-state competition 
currently bearing on the red snapper season. 
A regional management strategy will consider the unique differences 
and needs in each Gulf region. Specifically, the needs of anglers from 
states with nine-mile jurisdictions can be addressed in a different manner 
than those of fishermen who need only travel three miles to fish in federal 
waters.218 Furthermore, a regional strategy will enable the enactment of 
regulations appropriate to each state’s particular circumstances, such as 
variations in weather patterns and tourist seasons among the Gulf states.219 
Additionally, a Gulf state’s research programs will asses with greater 
accuracy the migratory patterns and presence of red snapper in its state 
waters and federal waters during certain time periods, making it more 
tenable for states to ensure that red snapper are not overfished in one area 
as compared to another, thus maintaining a healthy population in both 
federal and state waters. By planning state and federal seasons 
conjunctively, the states will be able to set regulations that avoid providing 
private anglers an unfair advantage in freer access to state waters that 
federal for-hire operators lack. 
Cooperative federalism between the Council and Gulf states will 
ensure the most effective management plan. The states possess the 
optimum means and measures to evaluate their regions’ fishing needs and 
deficiencies, and they will correct those issues if given the authority to set 
their own standards. Under a cooperative federalist regime, the states’ 
ability to communicate their regional status to federal agencies will benefit 
those agencies by providing them with better knowledge to inform 
administrative decision-making. Furthermore, a regional management 
program will also place a check on states’ powers by requiring submission 
of all chosen regulations to the GMFMC, which would ensure that the 
regulations align with the goals and provisions of the FMP. Finally, 
mandated approval by the Secretary of Commerce would guarantee 
consistency between the respective states’ regulations, the GMFMC’s 
FMP, and the goals, national standards, and requirements of the MSA. 
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Despite its numerous benefits, a regional management program will, 
admittedly, not be without flaws. A regional regulatory system is inherently 
more complex. The overall quota for the entire Gulf region must be 
appropriately and rationally distributed amongst all of the states, and such 
allocation can cause prospective debate—that task has, in fact, already caused 
delays in the process.220 Additionally, the synergy of federal and state 
management efforts could potentially generate further conflict between the 
two entities.221 Moreover, authority vested in multiple governing bodies, as 
opposed to one federal sovereign, could decrease efficiency in managing the 
red snapper species. States must also be receptive to accepting new quotas, 
should geographical changes in the distribution of red snapper so require.222 
Regional management would also be more expensive due to the necessity of 
collecting larger data samples and examining more extensive catch records.223 
Finally, regulatory enforcement could be problematic, especially along 
boundaries between regions with differing seasons and limits.224 
Before enacting a regional management strategy for the recreational Gulf 
red snapper fishery, the Council must contemplate solutions to these problems 
and preparations must be made to address any complications. For example, to 
ameliorate the enforcement issues raised by anomalous regulations along 
regional boundaries, agents could, upon checking a fishermen’s dockside 
landings, adhere to the standards of the adjoining state with the more liberal 
regulations.225 
Despite the potential obstacles that a regional management strategy might 
present, that regime still offers the best solution to the current problems in 
federal Gulf red snapper management; regional management may in fact be 
the only truly effective method of resolving the ills facing the Gulf fishery. 
For that reason, the Council must agree on an appropriate quota allocation for 
each Gulf state and trust the states to efficiently and effectively impose 
regulations, in keeping with the goals of the MSA, on red snapper in its region. 
Enactment of either H.R. 3094 or Amendment 39 should sufficiently 
provide for proper conservation and preservation of the Gulf red snapper 
species, while rendering the maximum harvest to commercial and recreational 
fishermen alike. Amendment 39, however, offers more possible management 
options than H.R. 3094. Thus, Amendment 39 ostensibly provides the more 
sound solution to the management problem, as the Gulf Council and Gulf 
states can continue to research and analyze which alternatives of each of the 
amendment’s actions should be implemented. 
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CONCLUSION 
The recent debate surrounding the federal management of Gulf red 
snapper arises from years of complications and controversies surrounding 
this unique fish, upon which so much of the Gulf region’s cultural identity 
and financial well-being turns. Despite a massive decline in the species in 
the late twentieth century, federal regulations have allowed the Gulf red 
snapper population to prosper. Recently, however, federal recreational 
management standards have been forced to contend with increasing catch 
rates and broader, more liberal state regulations. This competition has led 
to a calamitous regulatory landscape for fishermen and has produced 
unfavorable results for federal agencies. In an attempt to address the 
complications of recreational red snapper management, the GMFMC’s 
approval of Amendment 40 represents only the first step towards 
effectively regulating this component of the fishery. While the 
consequences of Amendment 40 are yet to be seen, more comprehensive 
options must be explored, and further action will be necessary. 
Although the plan will likely not take effect for a few years, a regional 
management strategy should be agreed upon and implemented to 
effectively regulate the Gulf recreational red snapper sector. Such a 
program provides the most viable path to achieving proper preservation 
and conservation of the species, while at the same time maximizing 
harvests and access for anglers. Sportfishing for Gulf red snapper bears 
too much economic and cultural significance for both the Gulf region, and 
the United States as a whole, to allow the fishery to continuously be thrust 
into a state of contentious debate and poor regulatory measures. Fishermen 
and governmental agencies alike will discover harmony and success in 
enacting a regional management strategy that motivates both state and 
federal officials to mutually bolster the conservation and management of 
this coveted fish. 
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